The Political Objective and Strategic Goal of Nonviolent Actions

July 20th, 2014

FAKE NEWS for the Zionist agenda

All nonviolent struggles are conducted simultaneously in the political andstrategic spheres, and these spheres, which are distinct, interactthroughout. I have discussed this at length elsewhere: see ‘The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach‘

Despite this, only rarely have nonviolent struggles been conducted with aconscious awareness of this vitally important relationship. Gandhi’s campaigns were very effective partly because he understood the distinctionand relationship between politics and strategy in nonviolent struggle. Andthe failure of many campaigns can be attributed, in part, to the fact thatmost activists do not. To illustrate the distinction and the relationshipbetween these two spheres, and to highlight their vital importance, thisarticle discusses them within the simpler context of nonviolent actions.

Every nonviolent action has a political objective and a strategic goal.When planning an action, it is vitally important to distinguish betweenits objective and its goal. The political objective of the action is astatement of what the group wants to do: to demonstrate in the citysquare, to hang a peace sign on the nuclear warship, to picket a factory,to blockade the bulldozer, to occupy the embassy, to go on strike. But whydoes the group want to do this? Usually, it is to persuade one or moresections of the community to act differently in relation to the campaignissue. So the strategic goal identifies, first, who the group wants toinfluence, and second, what they want them to do. For example, if thepolitical objective is to demonstrate in the city square, one possiblestrategic goal might be to cause members of the public to speak out insupport of the activist perspective. If the political objective is topicket a factory, the strategic goal might be to cause workers (throughpersuasion) not to enter it. If the political objective is to blockade abulldozer, the strategic goal might be to cause workers to stop logging,or, if the media is present, to cause television viewers to not buy old-growth timber from a particular company.

As can be seen from these simple examples, it makes more sense to decidethe strategic goal first, and to then design an action to ensure that thegoal is achieved. In other words, it is superior strategy to 1. decide whoyou want to influence and what you want them to do (derived from thepolitical and strategic assessment that guides your struggle), 2. decideon a tactic that will do this, and 3. design the action so that it will dothis most effectively. Thus, a strategic goal should be stated using thisform: to cause a specified group of people to act in a specified way.Further examples of strategic goals that conform to this formula include:to cause trade unionists to place work-bans on ships carrying uranium, tocause more men to speak out publicly against domestic violence, to causebuilders to stop using old-growth timber.

Once the strategic goal has been carefully and specifically defined,equally careful thought should be put into working out what tactic (atthis stage of the strategy) will most likely achieve this goal and how itshould be designed (so that it will cause the specified audience to act inthe specified way). Of course, good action design requires an awareness ofwhat makes nonviolent action work in the first place.

Nonviolent action works because of its capacity to create a favourablepolitical atmosphere (because of, for example, the way in which activisthonesty builds trust); its capacity to create a non-threatening physicalenvironment (because of the nonviolent discipline of the activists); andits capacity to alter the human psychological conditions (both innate andlearned) that make people resist new ideas in the first place. Thisincludes its capacity to reduce or eliminate fear and its capacity to’humanise’ activists in the eyes of more conservative sections of thecommunity. In essence, nonviolent activists precipitate change becausepeople are inspired by the honesty, discipline, integrity, courage anddetermination of the activists – despite arrests, beatings or imprisonment– and are thus inclined to identify with them. Moreover, as an extensionof this, they are inclined to act in solidarity.

To summarise and illustrate the argument so far, consider a nonviolentstruggle in which the activists are working to end sexual violence in alocal community. One strategic goal of the group might be: to cause themen in a specified group (perhaps those in a particular organisation) totake specified action (sign a personal pledge to not use pornography? puta sign in their front window saying they abhor sexual violence? undertaketo speak out publicly against all forms of sexual violence? join a groupthat organises counselling for male perpetrators?) to help halt sexualviolence in that community. The strategic goal will be achieved, at leastin part, if some men respond by doing the specified act(s). So what shouldbe the political objective of the action; that is, what nonviolent actionwill best cause the specified men to act in this way? To ‘out’ knownperpetrators by putting their photograph in public places? To conduct astreet rally involving local women? To repaint a billboard thatobjectifies women? To picket the local hotel or brothel every Saturdaynight? To organise an exhibition of artwork by survivors of sexualviolence? Or something else? For the action to be strategically effective,it must be planned to achieve the strategic goal.

And how might the action be designed to maximise its effectiveness? Whatqualities (truthfulness? dignity? respectfulness?) can the activistsdemonstrate that will most influence these men? How can the action becarried out in a way that engages these men? For example, human needstheory suggests that if you want people to change their behaviour,activists must provide opportunities for involvement that allow people toenhance their self-esteem and/or security, at least.

If the strategic goal of a nonviolent action is achieved, then the actionwas strategically effective; this does not mean or require, however, thatits political objective was achieved. In fact, it might not have been.This is because strategic effectiveness is unrelated to the achievement ofthe political objective. For example, the political objective of activistsmight be to blockade a bulldozer. However, the (usually unspecified)strategic goal of the bulldozer blockade should be something like this: tocause consumers to stop buying (the specified) paper products that aremade from woodchips taken from old-growth forest (by a specified company).In this case, as long as the action is well-designed, it does not matterif the activists are arrested before the blockade takes place, because themessage of their truthfulness, commitment, discipline, courage andsacrifice, together with the solidarity action they are calling for (whichwill undermine the power of their opponent), will still go out to theiraudience. In short, the failure to physically stop the bulldozer isstrategically irrelevant.

It is the failure to distinguish between the political objective and thestrategic goal that often causes a great deal of confusion, particularlyaround such questions as the role of secrecy and sabotage, in planningnonviolent actions. Many groups attach great importance to the politicalobjective of their action, and use secrecy to improve their prospects ofbeing able to carry it out. But this is invariably counterproductive, inthe strategic sense, and is based on a flawed understanding of how and whynonviolence works. This is because, as explained above, achievement of thepolitical objective is not equivalent to achievement of the strategicgoal. And while many activists achieve their (secret) political objective,they fail to achieve (what should be) their strategic goal (to causespecified people to act in the specified way) because the qualities (suchas honesty and integrity) of activists that inspire their audience are notallowed into play. (There are, of course, many other reasons why the useof secrecy is strategically counterproductive.)

For some types of action – such as a rally, a picket or a strike – no onewould even suggest using secrecy. But whatever the action, as explainedabove, strategic effectiveness is unrelated to whether the action issuccessfully carried out or not (provided it is strategically selected,well-designed and sincerely attempted). This point was classicallyillustrated by the Indian satyagrahis who attempted to nonviolently invadethe Dharasana salt works in 1930. (Because it illustrates the point soeffectively, I have simply repeated the example that I cited in an earlierarticle. See ‘Nonviolent Activism and [the] Police‘

Despite repeated attempts by manyhundreds of activists to walk into the salt works during a three weekperiod, not one activist got a pinch of salt! But an account of theactivists’ nonviolent discipline, commitment and courage – under the batonblows of the police – was reported in 1,350 newspapers around the world.As a result, this action – which failed to achieve the political objectiveof seizing salt – functionally undermined support for British imperialismin India. (For an account of the salt raids at Dharasana, see ThomasWeber. ‘”The Marchers Simply Walked Forward Until Struck Down”: Nonviolent Suffering and Conversion‘

If the activists had resorted to the use of secrecy, there would have beenno chance to demonstrate their honesty, integrity and determination – andto thus inspire empathy for their cause – although they might have gotsome salt! (If salt had been removed secretly, the British governmentcould, if they had chosen, ignored it: after all, who would have known orcared? However, they could not afford to let the satyagrahis take saltopenly because salt removal was illegal and failure to react would haveshown the salt law – a law that represented the antithesis of Indianindependence – to be ineffective.)

For essentially the same reason (as well as many others not discussedhere), sabotage is strategically counterproductive when employed as partof a nonviolent struggle. If the important aspect of a nonviolent actionis its strategic goal, then activists who plan acts of sabotage (that is,for example, their political objective is to disable a bulldozer or todestroy the nose cone of a nuclear missile) must be able to identify howthis act will cause their specified audience(s) to act on the issue in thespecified way(s). If they cannot, the action might well be strategicallyineffective or even counterproductive, no matter how much media attentionis gained if the political objective (damaging the equipment) is achieved.Thus, although this act might mobilise some people (and recent conflicttheory provides several thorough explanations of why it will be few), thefact remains that activists who use sabotage (and the secrecy that almostinvariably accompanies it) are placing too much emphasis on theirpolitical objective (the act of sabotage itself) rather than their(unidentified) strategic goal. As explained above, this limits thepossibility of activist qualities that inspire the audience being allowedinto play.

Whether or not activists achieve their political objective isstrategically irrelevant. This is because an effective nonviolent actionis designed to achieve its strategic goal, irrespective of the response ofopponents or the authorities to the political objective of the action.Whether or not activists achieve their strategic goal, however, is alwaysstrategically determinative.

Source Article from http://www.nationofchange.org/political-objective-and-strategic-goal-nonviolent-actions-1405784376