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March 5th, 2012 
FAKE NEWS for the Zionist agenda
“Iran’s leaders should know that I do not have a policy of containment,” he
said. “I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And
as I’ve made clear time and again during the course of my presidency, I will
not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend the United States
and its interests.”
By ruling out containment in the same breath as he stressed his willingness to
use force, Mr Obama subtly but unmistakably hardened his previous formula,
which was simply that “all options are on the table”. Paradoxically, he
probably believes that this tougher message actually reduces the possibility
of war. By reassuring Mr Netanyahu, the president hopes to reduce the
chances of a unilateral Israeli strike; by escalating the pressure on Iran,
Mr Obama will be calculating that the chances of a diplomatic solution are
increased.
Yet if yesterday’s speech was for the ears of the pro-Israel lobby, a
remarkable interview that the president gave to the Atlantic magazine last
week offered a glimpse of how his famously cool head was wrestling with his
choices over Iran.
This most cautious of leaders made the sober prediction that, if Iran went
nuclear, “four or five” other countries in the Middle East would follow
suit, triggering what he called a “free-for-all”. “And at that point,” added
Mr Obama, “the prospect for miscalculation in a region that has that many
tensions and fissures is profound.”
At a minimum, the global economy would be thrown off balance and energy
supplies disrupted. The risks of nuclear escalation would also be hugely
multiplied. If the nuclear-tipped confrontation between India and Pakistan
is dangerous enough, a four- or five-cornered arms race in the Middle East
would, said the president, “duplicate the challenges of India and Pakistan
fivefold or tenfold”. As such, he said, the Iran confrontation was not
something that “we’d like to solve: I’m saying this is something we have to
solve”.
In the interview, the president also showed how the risks of war are preying
on his mind. Unlike Iraq or Libya – or any of America’s other recent
adversaries – Iran has multiple ways of retaliating in the event of a
military strike. Hizbollah, the radical Shia group in south Lebanon, could
turn the conflict into a regional conflagration by bombarding Israel with
its 40,000 Iranian-supplied missiles. Iran could use its own arsenal of
Shahab-3 ballistic missiles to strike Western targets across the Middle
East, from the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain to the
high-rise hotels of Dubai. Its navy could seek to close the Strait of
Hormuz, through which 35 per cent of the world’s seaborne oil passes every
day. Any such assault would almost certainly fail and the waterway would
probably stay open – but even a botched attempt would cause oil prices to
soar, dealing a grave blow to the global economy.
With the uprising in Syria entering a crucial phase, Mr Obama raised another
objection to military action. “At a time when there is not a lot of sympathy
for Iran and its only real ally is on the ropes,” he asked, “do we want a
distraction in which suddenly Iran can portray itself as a victim?” He also
showed that he is mindful of the central argument against a pre-emptive
strike: that it would only delay, rather than end, Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Any facilities that America destroys could be rebuilt, meaning that war
would only buy time – and probably not more than five or 10 years, even on a
generous estimate.
Hence, Mr Obama told the Atlantic: “It is important for us to see if we can
solve this thing permanently, as opposed to temporarily. And the only way,
historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear
weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves
take [nuclear weapons] off the table.”
The president’s words showed that his overriding preference remains to secure
a diplomatic settlement. Under a best-case scenario, this would involve Iran
permanently giving up its capacity to enrich uranium – although not its
civil nuclear programme – in return for a lifting of sanctions and the
ending of its diplomatic isolation.
So far, so good. But Iran would certainly press for more. If Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, the country’s Supreme Leader, is minded to settle at all – and his
public statements suggest quite the opposite – he will insist on formal US
acceptance of the legitimacy of his regime and of its wider role in the
Middle East. He will also demand the right to continue enriching uranium,
albeit at levels that can only be used for civilian purposes, perhaps with
safeguards to guard against the manufacture of weapons-grade material.
If such a deal were on offer – perhaps via back-channel negotiations that may,
at some level, have already begun – would it be acceptable to Mr Obama? And
if he chose to agree, how would Israel react, let alone America’s allies in
the Arab world?
The Sunni kingdoms of the Gulf share Israel’s visceral suspicion of Tehran.
Indeed, their own fears are probably greater, thanks to their closer
proximity. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states would probably join Mr
Netanyahu’s government in tacit opposition to any settlement that allowed
Iran to extend its influence in the Middle East and to continue enriching
uranium. Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khamenei’s legion of domestic opponents would
feel a sense of betrayal if the US were to accept the legitimacy of Tehran’s
repressive, theocratic regime.
In short, even if Iran’s leadership decides that it wants to end this
confrontation, the highly sensitive business of defusing the situation would
still land Mr Obama with more thorny decisions. Every move on this
four-dimensional chessboard creates reactions that give rise to still more
dilemmas. And in the end, only one man can take the biggest decisions. Mr
Obama must either grasp the multiple nettles that have been thrust into his
hand, or risk being overwhelmed by a crisis not of his making.
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