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May 3rd, 2012 
FAKE NEWS for the Zionist agenda
His aim was simple: kill Americans and not Muslims – except when absolutely “necessary”.
In a 48-page letter to Attiyah Abdul Rahman, a key al-Qaeda leader, bin
Laden laid out a plan with eerie parallels to the attacks on September 11.
He told his subordinate to “pick a number of the brothers – not to
exceed 10 – and send them to their countries individually, without any of
them knowing the others, to study aviation”. Like the original
September 11 hijackers, they would ideally be from Gulf countries and bin
Laden hoped their home governments might pay for their pilot training, in
line with the policy of oil-rich nations funding the education of their
citizens.
The aim would be to regain the loyalty of a “large portion of those who
had lost their trust in the mujahideen [holy warriors].” The volunteers
would be picked with “utmost care and with very accurate
specifications, one of which is that they are willing to conduct suicide
actions.” Writing in May 2010, bin Laden said this was part of a “policy
of focusing on the bigger enemy” namely the “Crusader Zionist
alliance”.
Only a week before he died, he considered a plan from al-Qaeda’s affiliate in
Yemen to carry out a “poison” attack. In keeping with his anxiety
over al-Qaeda’s bloodstained image, he urged caution, but refrained from
vetoing the scheme.
“Regarding the operations that the brothers in Yemen are intending to
conduct using poison, please be careful of doing it without enough study of
all aspects, including political and media reaction,” he wrote on 26
April 2011.
BIN LADEN’S REGRETS
Bin Laden complained of “miscalculations by the brothers” which had
cost Muslim lives, in the letter written in May 2010. When mistakes were
made, al-Qaeda should “apologise for these errors and be held
responsible”, he said.
If striking the US homeland was impractical, bin Laden told his followers to
target American interests in non-Muslim countries, such as South Korea. “We
shall avoid carrying out attacks in Islamic countries except for the
countries that fell under invasion and direct occupation,” he wrote.
Bin Laden summed up: “We need to confirm to the brothers that every
effort that could be spent on attacks in America would not be spent outside
of it”.
Bin Laden worried that the al-Qaeda name itself had been tarnished, toying
with a list of alternatives, including the “Monotheism and Jihad Group”
and the “Restoration of the Caliphate Group”.
Another dominant theme is frustration with the Pakistani Taliban.
Abdul Rahman and Abu Yahya al-Libi, another senior al-Qaeda figure, wrote to
the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, criticising “clear legal errors
and dangerous lapses”. In particular they warned against killing
Muslims at marketplaces and mosques. “We hope that you will take the
necessary action to correct your actions and avoid these grave mistakes;
otherwise we have to take decisive actions from our end,” they said in
December 2010.
Bin Laden also urged restraint over the fate of the French hostages held by
his allies in North Africa. This group, styling itself “al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb”, specialises in kidnapping Westerners.
Writing at the height of the Nato bombing campaign against Col Gaddafi’s
regime in Libya in March 2011, bin Laden suggested that France’s standing
among Arab opinion was high enough to justify restraint.
“As far as the French hostages with our brothers in the Islamic Maghreb,”
he wrote, “I want to warn that the atmosphere after the French standing
towards the Libyan people does not condone killing the French”. He
added: “If we need to kill them, then that should be after the end of
Libyan events and their developments.”
AL-QAEDA BUREAUCRACY
Again and again, bin Laden complained about his followers ignoring proper
procedures. An al-Qaeda rule book discovered in his compound laid out an
elaborate structure of committees and departments, all with the goal of
promoting “the truth”, getting “rid of evil” and
founding an “Islamic Nation”.
This laid out that “departmental expertise must be respected at high and
low administrative levels and it should not be overstepped”.
In the tradition of the fustiest civil service, the rule book added: “However,
in case the highest official allows this overstepping, then it is the right
of the immediate official to complain about him.”
Thus bin Laden complained that the attempt to bring down a US airliner over
Detroit in December 2009 had not been properly coordinated and “it
would be nice” if a message to that effect was circulated. When the
Pakistani Taliban failed to detonate a car bomb in New York in 2010, bin
Laden wrote: “Tell them that we started planning work inside America
many years ago, and gained experience in that field.” He complained
that America was now saying that al-Qaeda was “unable to conduct a
large operation that is well planned”.
BIN LADEN’S MEDIA STRATEGY
As early as October 2010, bin Laden proposed a media strategy to mark the 10th
anniversary of the attacks on September 11. The aim would be to mobilise
Muslims and “restore their confidence,” he wrote. “We should
also present our just cause to the world, especially to the European people.”
Bin Laden suggested seeking out an American television network that was “close
to being unbiased”, suggesting CBS. He also mentioned favoured
journalists who would be supplied with material for a documentary, singling
out Abd-al-Bari Atwan, the London-based editor of Al-Quds Al-Arabi, an
Arabic newspaper, and Robert Fisk, the Middle East Correspondent of The
Independent.
“I also think that you should write to Abd-al-Bari Atwan and Robert Fisk
and tell them that the tenth anniversary is coming and it is the harvest of
a fierce war between the Mujahideen and America. This is a chance to explain
our motives for continuing the war,” wrote bin Laden.
Handling the media is a recurring theme of the documents. Abdul Rahman, who
was killed last year by a US drone strike, wrote to bin Laden in June 2009
proposing a list of writers and thinkers who opposed al-Qaeda whose
credibility could supposedly be destroyed by revealing their “defects”.
Meanwhile, bin Laden apparently took the time to edit the statements of his
underlings. When Ayman al-Zawahiri, then al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, released
an address on the Arab Spring in March 2011, his grammar was carefully
corrected by an unnamed editor – possibly bin Laden.
The anonymous hand confronted the fact that al-Qaeda had played no part in the
Arab Spring and gently advised against claiming that the revolutions would
not have happened without the September 11 attacks.
“I am afraid that this sentence might be inappropriate and might be
perceived by many people as braggadocio and an attempt to monopolise the
accomplishment,” he wrote.
BIN LADEN AT BAY
Bin Laden offered advice to al-Qaeda leaders in hiding, stressing the need to
keep children indoors and prevent them from inadvertently betraying their
parents. “One of the most important security issues in the cities is
controlling children, by not getting out of the house except for extreme
necessity like medical care, and teaching them the local language,” he
wrote.
Bin Laden added that “with the grace of Allah”, he had been “adhering
to these precautions for nine years”.
Despite all this care, America had already hunted down bin Laden by the time
he wrote those words on 26 April 2011. Exactly six days later, he was killed
by US commandos.
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