Economically, the model invoked by interim leaders and technocrats is Dubai;
politically, it is Turkey. Crucially, the Libyan people united in their
revolution to force a break with the past, giving most of the population a
stake in coming together now to forge a better future.
However, while these positive indicators bode well for the long-term, they are
increasingly eclipsed by a degenerating situation on the ground. This is
closely linked to the failure of the transitional authority to accomplish
its first and most pressing objective of disarming the population but, more
importantly, the increasingly independent and powerful revolutionary
brigades (or militias as they are sometimes referred to).
The most prominent of these brigades are territory specific, with the most
powerful coming from Misurata and Zintan. They refuse to relinquish their
weapons, subject themselves to NTC authority and consequently have
considerable control over the security, political and commercial environment
within their respective regions of influence.
Of course, this could be acceptable and effective were militias integrated
into a representative and proper power-sharing mechanism; but as of yet, the
NTC’s lack of authority and the absence of a respected national army and
police force has provided for violent clashes between militias and NTC
forces (and between rival militia groups themselves); a lack of transparency
and accountability; and human rights abuses, including most notably against
prisoners and the displaced people of Tawergha.
More broadly, these deficiencies have profound consequences for the future of
the region as well as the interests of the international community, largely
because of the proliferation of arms and the open borders that cannot be
properly policed without organised security forces.
Far from dealing with these ongoing problems, holding elections prior to
disarmament could exacerbate divisions and entrench the prevailing military
balance of power. They could also intensify the dangerous process of
personalisation in Libyan politics – this time, around militia commanders –
that seems a hangover from the Qadhafi era.
This is especially worrying given that the 200-member national assembly
elected in June will draft Libya’s new constitution.
In addition, the Islamist advantage demonstrated in Tunisia and Egypt emerged
from the combination of a religiously-based legitimating discourse,
pre-existing networks and formidable resources from the Gulf. In Libya that
advantage is amplified further by the Islamists’ links to some of the more
powerful armed groups.
Our experiences in both Iraq and Libya suggest that postponing elections until
there is a capable and coherent security apparatus will help the democratic
process rather than regress it. In Iraq, elections took place despite a
Sunni boycott and despite ongoing violence. Whilst this was a necessity in
Iraq, because of the need to quickly transfer power from a foreign force to
the Iraqi people, Libyans are in a position to independently determine their
future.
Elections in Iraq went ahead without prior reconciliation among the country’s
population, which increased resentment among the Sunni population toward the
Shia, now the democratically elected rulers of the country. The Sunni
agitation led to an emboldened and more determined insurgency, a breakdown
in security (because of the lack of an effective army) and, consequently,
terrorist bastions throughout the country.
The Iraq case becomes partially relevant as a touchstone because, unlike
Tunisia or Egypt, Libya is post-conflict. Of course, Libya has no agitated
bloc and divisions among the population are not as severe as Iraq’s, but the
general precedent is instructive. Irrespective of whether equal rights would
be enshrined in the forthcoming Libyan constitution it is ultimately an
issue of perception and trust: Libya needs more time and international
support in reconciling its differences and remedying fears of neglect
between different political and ideological factions, between new and old
power bases, tribes and regions.
Libyans have already started to embrace their democratic rights by demanding
more from their transitional government but there must also be an honest
recognition that elections under the current circumstances will not deal
with the militarisation of competing power centres: instead, they will
reflect and embed an unstable situation.
Ranj Alaaldin is a Middle East and North Africa political and security risk
analyst. Dr Alia Brahimi is a research fellow at the London School of
Economics.
Related posts:
Views: 0