Could Boudica’s Rebellion Have Succeeded? Part 1 of 2: The Strategy

August 13th, 2017

Awake Goy

Queen Boudica and victory

Boudica – the name of the iconic British queen of antiquity is derived from the ancient Celtic word for “victory” – bouda, with the name Boudica literally translating as “Victoria”. [1]

Queen Boudica’s reputation remains to this day, as both the ruler of the British Iceni tribe and the leader of the uprising against Roman rule in 60–61 AD. Her challenge to Roman authority was by far the most serious challenge the province of Britannia would ever see, and one of the bloodiest rebellions in Rome’s entire history.

Although the uprising would ultimately be crushed at the Battle of Watling Street, Boudica’s rebel force would initially devastate key Roman centres of power in addition to the elite IX Hispana legion.

This string of initial successes prompts the enquiring mind to ponder whether Boudica could have in fact achieved total victory had circumstances been different, and this is the intriguing question we shall consider in this two-part series.

Overview of this two-part series

We shall begin with the present article outlining the political and military strategies needed for a British victory against the occupying Roman forces, conducting a hypothetical re-run of events following an adjustment of various parameters. We then follow Boudica’s campaign but stop short of the actual showdown at Watling Street.

In the second part of this series (Could Boudica’s Rebellion Have Succeeded? Part 2/2: The Showdown), we consider the strategic and tactical options most likely to have given victory to the Britons at the Battle of Watling Street. We then replay events as per these strategic and tactical adjustments.

In the final analysis, no definitive answer can ever be offered to address the hypothetical question of a Boudican victory. But by considering all relevant factors and making informed strategic suggestions, we can at least build a picture that approaches some kind of approximation.

Article contents

1. Layout of this article
2. British Celtic tribes and the geopolitical situation
3. Roman invasions and British resistance
4. The Druids, resentment, and the road to rebellion
5. Military options on the broad strategic level
6. The Fabian strategy
7. Defeat in detail strategy
8. Prelude to the rebellion
9. An overview of the rebellion as it occurred historically
10. Analysis: successes of the rebellion
11. Shortcomings of the rebellion: failure to save the Druidic priesthood
12. Shortcomings of the rebellion: poor discipline and wasted time
13. Shortcomings of the rebellion: failure to utilize Roman armour
14. Shortcomings of the rebellion: summary
15. Minimizing British shortcomings
16. Specific measures for improving British discipline and organization
17. Improving British reconnaissance
18. Additional considerations
19. A hypothetical re-run of events

1. Layout of this article

Although a military assessment focusing on the tactical level is provided in the second part of this series, this first article concentrates on the broader strategic level. To this end, we shall examine factors on the geopolitical, geostrategic, social, and even religious levels. We then determine the general military strategy hypothetically needed for a British victory.

Armed with this knowledge, we will then assess Boudica’s rebellion as it happened historically, identifying where it was successful, and where its shortcomings lay. We then suggest remedies for these shortcomings, and the final section of this article (Section 19: “A hypothetical re-run of events”) conducts a hypothetical replay of events as per these alterations.

As we shall see, improvements to British performance in just three key areas – reconnaissance, discipline and organization – could have made an enormous difference during the campaign, with the Druidic priesthood having a fascinating central role to play.

We shall now begin our assessment by way of presenting a brief history of Britain leading up to and following the Roman conquest in 43 AD, and the geopolitical situation that emerged as a result. We then examine the role played by the Druidic priesthood against this backdrop of events.

2. British Celtic tribes and the geopolitical situation

By about the sixth century BC, Celtic culture was widely established throughout Britain, although initial migration had probably began much earlier than this. [2] During the latter two centuries of this period, there was a further phase of Celtic migration to the island in the form of the Gallo-Belgic Celts from northern Gaul, which would shape the geopolitical climate of the country.

The newer Gallo-Belgic arrivals settled largely along the southern tier of Britain adjacent to the coast, and comprised the tribes of the Belgae, Atrebates, Regni, and Cantiaci (see Figure 1). [3] Some tensions between the older Iron Age Celts and the newer Gallo-Belgic groups had naturally arisen as a result of competition for land and resources. However, after the Roman conquest of 43 AD, Gallo-Belgic cooperation with the Roman occupiers caused new tensions. The resulting antipathy would have been especially prominent towards the Gallo-Belgic leader King Cogidubnus to the south, who was a firm Roman ally, and who ruled over all four Gallo-Belgic tribes along the coast (the Belgae, Atrebates, Regni, and Cantiaci – refer to Figure 1). [4], [5]

Rome had good reason to lavish Cogidubnus with rewards and maintain friendly relations: the ports along the coastal lands he controlled were vital for maintaining the communications link between Rome and the province.

Figure 1 displays the geopolitical situation in Britain at the time, categorizing alliances with Rome as follows: (1) anti-Roman, (2) strong Roman or (3) passive / ambiguous (based on information provided by Webster, 2004). Understanding these loyalties would naturally have been vital to the planning of the rebellion.

3. Roman invasions and British resistance

The first Roman incursions into Britain occurred under Julius Caesar in 55–54 BC, and were successful only in establishing a client kingdom arrangement and promised tribute from several tribes. Initial British resistance to the invasion was led by Cassivellaunus (who was most likely the king of the Catuvellauni tribe), but was eventually subdued. [6]

Rome finally launched a full-scale invasion a century later in 43 AD under the emperor Claudius. Resistance to the invasion was led by the formidable military leader Caratacus and his brother Togodumnus (from the ruling family of the Catuvellauni tribe, as was Cassivellaunus a century earlier), but was ultimately unsuccessful.

Despite fierce pockets of resistance in addition to an ongoing guerrilla campaign led by Caratacus which lasted until 51 AD, Roman control of the country was quickly established.

4. The Druids, resentment, and the road to rebellion

When we consider events in Britain following the Roman invasion under Claudius in 43 AD, we can clearly see the pivotal role played by the Druidic priesthood in keeping the spirit of resentment and rebellion alive amongst the Britons. [7]

To understand the full context of Druidic involvement, we firstly need to understand this ancient Celtic order.

The Druidic priesthood was an elite class within British Celtic society, being recruited from the landowning nobility immediately below the ruling families of the various tribes, and was central in maintaining the cultural order throughout the lands. [8] The priesthood’s roles extended to religious, cultural, legal, and even medical spheres, and also included the preservation of tribal history and lore. Crucially, the priesthood functioned as the intermediary between the people and the spirit world, being privy to the secrets of the gods and the power of magic, even holding insights regarding the seasons and the elements. [8]

The Druids held significant political sway and were important advisors to the tribal nobility and the ruling elite. Critically, the Druids could tap into the deep emotions and passions of the people, swaying their fears and beliefs.

Against the Romans, the Druids functioned as highly effective political provocateurs working covertly behind the scenes, bringing their influence to bear as far back as the incursions of Julius Caesar (55–54 BC). [9]

There is even speculation that Caratacus (who led British resistance between 43–51 AD) and his brother Togodumnus were in fact initiated into the secret rites of the Druidic order, and won over to the cause of defending the institution. [10]

Following the invasion of 43 AD, the priesthood took the liberty of fanning the flames of anti-Roman resentment at every given chance, and there was certainly no shortage of opportunities favourable to this end. The lingering bitterness in the wake of the Roman invasion was followed by heavy taxation for the construction of Roman roads and fortresses; ongoing harassment by Roman officials and foreign traders followed, with loans being forced on the British aristocracy at crippling interest rates. [11], [12] Then, between 48–51 AD, the Roman governor Ostorius Scapula terrorized parts of Southern Britain to aid his campaign against Caratacus.

Suffering an additional wave of abuses were Boudica’s Trinovantes neighbours, on whose land the Romans had erected their provincial capital Camulodunum. The Trinovantes would suffer brutal treatment, forced expulsions and land appropriations. They were then used as forced labour for the construction of the Temple of Claudius, the detested symbol of Roman subjugation.

And all the while behind the scenes, the Druidic priesthood continued to whisper into the ears of the British nobility and ruling elite, keeping the embers of resentment glowing hot.

The final indignity then came in the wake of the death of Boudica’s husband, King Prasutagus, whereupon the Romans began seizing the royal properties and possessions of the tribe. Upon protesting this action, Boudica was not only dethroned, but publicly flogged, and her two young daughters raped in a disgusting spectacle. The Iceni kingdom itself, which had been an ally of Rome in the form of a “client kingdom” arrangement, was then reduced to the status of servitude.

The explosion point had finally been reached.

Boudica met with her aggrieved Trinovantes neighbours in a council of war, and preparations for a full-scale uprising began in earnest.

5. Military options on the broad strategic level

Boudica would amass an enormous number of fighters during the course of the rebellion – perhaps 70,000 at the outset, increasing to as many as 100,000 leading up to the final showdown at Watling Street. In contrast, the Romans had four crack legions in Britannia at the time, equating to just over 20,000 men, with probably several thousand auxiliaries.

Although this gave the Britons a huge advantage in terms of numbers, the rebels were still at a massive disadvantage in terms of armour, weaponry, fighting skill, tactical ability, organization, discipline, leadership, and experience.

Boudica and her military commanders most likely had the foresight to realize that despite their numbers advantage, an all-out confrontation against all four legions combined in a single pitched battle would have been suicide.

What, then, would have constituted the optimal military strategy for the Britons hypothetically? In the context of avoiding pitched battles against a combined Roman force, only two realistic options present themselves:
(1) A Fabian strategy
(2) A defeat in detail strategy

Although there is some overlap between these concepts, the two constitute distinctly different strategic approaches. In order to choose which constitutes the strategy of choice for the Britons, we shall consider both.

6. The Fabian strategy

The Fabian strategy involves guerrilla tactics and is typically employed against an opponent which is too strong to be defeated in pitched battles. [13] The strategy derives its name from Quintus Fabius Maximus, the Roman general who introduced the eponymous strategy against Rome’s formidable opponent Hannibal in 217 BC.

Instead of engaging the stronger enemy in direct confrontation, a long-term war of attrition is inflicted by using hit and run tactics. The aim is to gradually wear down the opponent’s logistics, military capability and morale until their continued existence in the theatre is no longer possible.

On the surface, a Fabian strategy may sound like a plausible option for the Britons in 60–61 AD, however close consideration reveals the plan to be doomed to failure in Boudica’s case.

To begin with, a Fabian strategy may require years of commitment, something Boudica did not have unless she could have rallied almost all of the Iron Age Celtic tribes behind her. This would have been unlikely so long as the tribes were seeing only small-scale defeats being inflicted upon the Romans.

Secondly, so long as the Romans maintained control of the coastal ports, they could rely on reinforcements from across the channel indefinitely. Although Boudica’s rebels could have attempted to seize control of the coast before defeating the Roman legions inland, doing so would have opened them up to an impossible two-front war.

Furthermore, a successful Fabian strategy would have been made even more difficult in light of the Romans’ network of strongly-fortified positions throughout the south of the country, at least some of which were linked by fairly secure internal lines of communication, neither of which the Britons possessed to any comparable degree.

7. Defeat in detail strategy

In contrast to the Fabian strategy, the defeat in detail strategy entails engaging separate elements of an enemy in turn so that numerical superiority can be brought to bear against each of these elements in individual engagements. This is repeated until the entirety of the enemy’s force is defeated. [14]

Unlike the long-term Fabian strategy, a properly-executed defeat in detail approach can bring a campaign to a successful conclusion much quicker.

The challenge of the defeat in detail strategy, however, is to ensure that the separate elements of the opposing army are prevented from joining forces.

When we look at the situation in 60 AD, not only do we see conditions favourable for a defeat in detail strategy due to the wide dispersion of the Roman legions, but that defeat in detail does indeed appear to have been the strategy implemented by the Britons.

We shall now examine Boudica’s rebellion as it happened historically, beginning with a brief prelude to the rebellion. Following this, we will identify the successes and shortcomings of the rebellion, and suggest how these shortcomings could have been corrected.

8. Prelude to the rebellion

Following the military alliance made between Boudica’s Iceni tribe and the neighbouring Trinovantes, it is likely that a number of months of careful planning and preparations followed. Using an informed guess, a six-month period is a reasonable assumption.

An event of huge significance leading up to the rebellion was the decision by the Roman governor Suetonius Paulinus to strike a blow against the primary source of political dissent which had plagued Roman governance in Britain ever since 43 AD: the Druids.

Commanding the XIV Gemina and part of the XX Valeria Victrix legions, Paulinus most likely spent some of the winter months constructing flat-bottom craft at a military camp on the River Dee (modern-day Chester). [15]

As the weather warmed, Paulinus’ flotilla then crossed over to the Druids’ sanctuaries on the Isle of Mona (modern-day Anglesey), and the slaughter began in earnest.

Was Boudica and her fellow commanders aware of Paulinus’ preparations to move against the Druids? We will never know for sure.

9. An overview of the rebellion as it occurred historically

Meanwhile, to the south, Boudica’s revolt began. It was launched in spectacular fashion in the lands of the Trinovantes with the hated Roman capital of Camulodunum (Colchester) being stormed and put to the flame. The Temple of Claudius was partially destroyed, and thousands of retired Roman soldiers and their families slaughtered.

Although the destruction of Camulodunum was not an actual military victory, I personally maintain that it was even more helpful to Boudica’s cause than the destruction of an entire legion. This is because Camulodunum was a stunning symbolic and propaganda victory – one which was total and absolute, and one which would have inspired many Britons. Not only was Camulodunum the Roman capital itself, but the Temple of Claudius the very symbol of Roman dominion in Britain. Furthermore, many of the Roman families killed had actually taken refuge in the temple.

The victory was then consummated perfectly with the head of the bronze statue of Claudius itself being removed and cast into the River Alde in the lands of the Iceni.

The news of these deeds then reverberated far and wide across the lands like a shock wave.

Well before Camulodunum had even stopped burning, however, a further success, every bit as stunning, was achieved when most of the IX Hispana legion marching to the relief of the city was decimated by the rebels in a carefully-planned ambush.

Enamoured by these successes, the Durotriges tribe to the south-west then threw in their lot with Boudica and joined the rebellion, pinning down the entire II Augusta legion at its base in Exeter (see Figure 2). [16]

Upon hearing of the rebellion, Paulinus’ two legions crusading against the Druids on the Isle of Mona immediately abandoned the island and headed south.

Meanwhile, the Roman financial centre of Londinium (London) was Boudica’s next target, and suffered the same devastation as Camulodunum. Most of the inhabitants, however, had fled in advance.

With the IX Hispana legion now neutralized, and the II Augusta safely contained, Boudica was free to swing north into the Midlands region along Watling Street in order to locate the two legions under the command of the Paulinus.

En route to the Midlands region from Londinium, Boudica’s force came across the Gallo-Belgic settlement of Verulamium (St. Albans), whose inhabitants had collaborated with the Romans in the past, and this now attracted the fury of the rebels. The settlement was utterly razed, although the Gallo-Belgic inhabitants had fled in advance.

Figure 2 (below) provides an outline of Boudica’s movements during the campaign prior to Watling Street.

Boudica then moved north into the Midlands region, eventually locating and engaging Paulinus’ legions at Watling Street, where her force was routed and suffered a catastrophic defeat.

Had Paulinus’ two legions been destroyed, however, Boudica’s force would have been free to swing south-west, join up with the Durotriges tribe near Exeter, and move in to crush the II Augusta legion.

Such an outcome would have equated to over 85% of the total Roman force in Britain being accounted for, leaving only scattered cohorts throughout the rest of the lands. These remnants could have then been mopped up piecemeal over time.

The next logical target after a successful Watling Street conclusion would have been the coastal areas under King Cogidubnus to the south, resulting in the blocking of ports and denial of any immediate access to Roman reinforcements sailing across from Gaul.

10. Analysis: successes of the rebellion

Personally, I would contend that the actual strategic plan formulated by Boudica and her commanders was reasonably close to perfection – at least up until the final confrontation at Watling Street.

Furthermore, I maintain that the destruction of the two Roman settlements (Camulodunum and Londinium), far from being spontaneous, wanton acts destruction, was actually part of this carefully-planned stratagem, and was aimed at the achievement of two primary goals: (1) to win the support of at least some of the Iron Age Celts; and (2) to prevent the Roman legions from joining forces (in order to facilitate a defeat in detail strategy).

The success of this approach was seen when the devastation of the two settlements not only lured the IX Hispana legion to its destruction, but also won over the Durotriges tribe, which then pinned the II Augusta legion down at its base.

The destruction of Verulamium (the Gallo-Belgic settlement), meanwhile, was most likely intended as a warning shot over the bow of the Gallo-Belgic tribes, in particular King Cogidubnus, to provide a glimpse of what could happen should they side with the Romans militarily.

We shall now examine the shortcomings of the rebellion, followed by suggestions that could have remedied these errors.

11. Shortcomings of the rebellion: failure to save the Druidic priesthood

The Druidic priesthood could have played a key role during the rebellion by way of their influence on the various tribal leaders. Although their efforts would not have swayed all of the ruling families to side with Boudica, their involvement may still have tipped the balance enough for a British victory.

Although we don’t know whether or not Boudica and her fellow commanders were aware of Paulinus’ intentions to destroy the priesthood, it is fair to assume that Boudica’s level of intelligence-gathering was simply not up to the task of detecting the looming peril.

This was a tragic failing.

12. Shortcomings of the rebellion: poor discipline and wasted time

Although Boudica’s rebellion was very well planned on the strategic level prior to Watling Street, cracks in its actual execution began to appear right from the very start. This was seen at Camulodunum, Londinium and Verulamium, when the rebels, instead of staying tightly focused on their broader mission, wasted precious time in drunken celebration and in scouring the settlements for loot and fugitives. This occurred as a result of an intoxicating euphoria which quickly took hold of the ranks in the wake of the spectacular initial successes. [17]

It took some time for the British captains and lieutenants to gain control over the ranks and organise the fighters back into a cohesive force.

A dangerous overconfidence and complacency had thus arisen, which would squander precious initiative and ultimately give Paulinus enough time to muster enough men from the scattered legionary units posted throughout the Midlands region.

13. Shortcomings of the rebellion: failure to utilize Roman armour

Most likely, the curse of triumphalist euphoria also resulted in the failure of the Britons to gather the armour and weaponry of the vanquished IX Hispana legion for later military use at Watling Street.

Instead, the rebels, glossing over military realities, most likely hoarded the several thousand sets of Roman hardware for plunder and profit, making yet another significant error in judgement.

14. Shortcomings of the rebellion: summary

Considering the above three sections, we can begin to appreciate how basic but consistently repeated mistakes – chiefly in the areas of discipline, organization, and initially reconnaissance – began to add up, slowly but surely nudging the British rebels closer and closer towards the precipice of disaster.

We shall now outline some basic remedies for these tactical errors.

15. Minimizing British shortcomings

With approximately six months to prepare for the rebellion (assumed using an informed guess), no amount of training could have elevated the Britons to a level of skill comparable to that of the Roman legions. Furthermore, there was also the massive deficit in armour, weaponry, tactical ability, and experience which existed.

Nevertheless, I personally maintain that even fairly rudimentary measures could have tightened discipline and organization enough to have resulted in a marked improvement in performance. This would have greatly reduced the amount of time and initiative wasted, thereby massively curtailing Paulinus’ reaction time and placing him under far greater pressure to scrape together enough men for a stand at Watling Street.

In addition, the British arsenal would have been bolstered with as many as 3000 sets of Roman armour and weaponry.

16. Specific measures for improving British discipline and organization

In preparation for the rebellion (as it occurred historically), the Britons probably concentrated solely on swordsmanship skills and little else. Although this would have honed the rebels’ fighting skills for one-on-one combat and been useful for engaging unprepared Roman units (as was seen with the ambush of the IX Hispana), it did little to foster a sense of tactical flexibility and initiative. With limited tactical flexibility and initiative, the Britons were very restricted in what they could accomplish on the field, being limited to rudimentary frontal assaults and little else.

This state of affairs could have been greatly ameliorated by organizing the rebels into fixed units and by establishing a tight chain of command.

One of the most crucial tasks of all would have been to instil within the minds of the fighters the importance of unit cohesion and cooperation over and above the traditional individualistic style of combat favoured within Celtic culture. To overcome resistance to this concept, the field commanders would have needed to frame this change not as an abandonment of cultural practice, but rather a necessary, temporary alteration to better match Romans tactics.

During the preparatory period before the rebellion, then, it would have been essential to place just as much emphasis on the execution of orders down to the unit level as on swordsmanship skills.

Critically, all fighters should have been made aware of the need for tight disciplinary measures, with field commanders not hesitating to impose punitive measures during drills whenever orders were not obeyed.

17. Improving British reconnaissance

As already mentioned, British reconnaissance was a factor which needed improvement if there was any hope of saving the Druidic priesthood. The key to this would have rested on the detection of Paulinus’ military camp on the Dee River (at modern-day Chester), and perhaps several weeks of gathering information from the local tribespeople of the Cornovii tribe. [18]

If we assume that the rebels had six months of preparation before the rebellion was launched, and allow one month for the organization of reconnaissance teams, this would have given Boudica five months to gathering intelligence.

This period of time should have been more than adequate to have uncovered the intentions of Paulinus.

18. Additional considerations

Thus far we have covered most bases from which we can reconfigure British strategy against the Romans in 60 AD. There were, however, two additional factors worthy of consideration: Nero, the Roman emperor at the time, and secondly, Roman superstition.

Additional considerations: the Nero factor

From the account of Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus (The Twelve Caesars), there is a reasonable case to make that Emperor Nero was seriously considering withdrawing all legions from Britain in the wake of Boudica’s early successes, and only persevered to honour the earlier conquest by his (adoptive) father Claudius. [19] If the rebels had succeeded in vanquishing the legions of Paulinus, then there is a reasonable chance that Nero would have carried out an evacuation.

Additional considerations: Roman superstition

The Romans, like many people throughout history, were deeply superstitious. They believed in the gods of other cultures, and where necessary, took care to not to offend these deities.

Tacitus tells us that as the legionaries under Paulinus crossed the narrow straight to Mona island, they were awestruck to the point of near-paralysis upon viewing a religious ceremony being performed by the Druids. [20] Further south, meanwhile, disturbing signs and omens were reported by the Roman settlers at the outset of the revolt. This involved such portents as fits of hysteria, ghostly shrieks, visions of colonial ruins, a blood-red ocean, and corpse-like figures being left in the wake of an ebbing tide. [21] Were these omens real, exaggerated, or even imagined? It mattered not one iota. All that mattered was that the Romans believed the reports and were unnerved by them.

One therefore wonders whether the Britons could have played upon these superstitious as part of a psychological campaign to spread alarm and demoralization amongst the Romans.

19. A hypothetical re-run of events

Now that we have identified and addressed the shortcomings of the rebellion, we shall conduct a hypothetical re-run of events as per the adjustments outlined. For the sake of continuity, there will naturally be some overlap with the historical events already described.

Operation to evacuate the Druids

After launching an extensive reconnaissance operation in all parts of Britain, Boudica and her fellow commanders become aware of Paulinus’ camp in the lands of the Cornovii to the north-west. They correctly discern Roman intentions to move against the Druids on the Isle of Mona.

In order to evacuate the priesthood, Boudica launches the rebellion several weeks earlier than planned in order to draw Paulinus’ two legions away from the area. At the same time, a task force is sent to Mona to alert the priesthood.

Camulodunum is razed

The rebellion is meanwhile launched with the rebels destroying the Roman provincial capital of Camulodunum as planned. Many of the rebels begin to divert attention away from the mission by searching for plunder, but are bought back into line by the British field commanders. Some of the fighters are punished severely for breaches of discipline.

News of the audacious attack on the Roman capital meanwhile travels quickly, with dramatic tales of the destruction of the Temple of Claudius, the merciless treatment of the Roman inhabitants, and the decapitation of the bronze statue of the emperor Claudius itself.

The attack on Camulodunum is a propaganda triumph, inspiring many Britons, and inflaming anew resentment and hatred against the Roman occupiers.

Despite this, most of the ruling elite remain hesitant to join the rebellion out of fear of Roman retaliation.

The IX Hispana is destroyed

The IX Hispana legion, predictably marching to relieve the beleaguered Roman settlement, is then decimated as it enters a stretch of road narrowing through a wooded defile. Although only a few hundred Romans survive, the legionaries sell their lives dearly, taking with them some of the best fighters of the Iceni and Trinovantes tribes.

The Durotriges tribe joins Boudica

The ruling family of the Durotriges tribe, impressed by these successes and sensing a chance for victory over the Roman occupiers, joins the cause. This now makes it impossible for the II Augusta legion to move out from its base at Isca Dumnonlorum (Exeter) without facing ambush all along its route of travel, thereby facilitating Boudica’s planned defeat in detail strategy by keeping the legions apart.

The Druids launch a campaign of political persuasion

The Druidic priesthood abandons the sacred groves on the Isle of Mona. Realizing that their traditional communal order is no longer possible, the priesthood splits up to journey to the different British tribes, aiming to pressure the ruling elite to join the rebellion.

In a stroke of political genius, the Druids also induct many of the land-owning nobility into the secret rites of the Druidic order, a highly-coveted honour, which now gives the priesthood even greater influence over the respective tribes. This is in fact a repeat of the priesthood’s strategy almost two decades earlier, whereby Caratacus (the leader of British resistance at the time) and his brother Togodumnus were initiated into the fellowship, which allowed the Druids to have some degree of influence over the campaign.

For those tribes with strong Roman allegiances, the Druids are able to erode the support base of the ruling families by spreading dissent amongst the respective tribal nobility. This strategy is brought to bear in particular against the strongest Roman allies: King Cogidubnus to the south, and Queen Cartimandua of the Brigantes tribe to the north.

The strategic importance of the Catuvellauni and Dobunni tribes

The Catuvellauni and Dobunni tribes receive special attention from the Druids. Together, these tribes occupy strategically-important territory which could help Boudica tie up a large swath of territory between the Midlands and the tribal bloc under King Cogidubnus to the south. Additionally, cooperation with these tribes would allow a link-up with Boudica’s Durotriges allies to the south-west, thereby forming a huge continuous belt of rebel-controlled territory stretching across the southern part of the country (see Figure 3). This would force any travelling Roman legions to contend with hostile territory over large distances.

The Druids also utilize bards to arouse the passions and tribal spirit of the Catuvellauni. This is in the form of heroic tales of the two most prominent figures in Catuvellauni folklore: Cassivellaunus (who opposed Caesar a century earlier), and Caratacus.

Londinium falls

Following the razing of Camulodunum and the destruction of the IX Hispana, the Roman economic capital Londinium is targeted next. Although most of the inhabitants flee ahead of the rebels’ advance, the settlement is utterly destroyed.

The Catuvellauni tribe joins Boudica

Following the intense persuasion campaign by the Druids and the fall of Londinium, the king of the Catuvellauni tribe becomes convinced of a British victory and sides with Boudica.

The Druids launch a psychological campaign against the Romans

Being well aware of Roman superstitions, the priesthood formulates a plan to demoralize and alarm the occupiers. To this end, groups of Britons are organized to spread rumours amongst the Roman settlers regarding unsettling visions and portents of doom.

News of this would probably have spread quickly. It is not unreasonable to assume that a wave of discontent may have even spread throughout the ranks of Paulinus’ two legions, with the men pointing the blame at Paulinus himself for attempting to abuse the Celtic gods. This could have severely undermined the legions’ morale and confidence in Paulinus.

The Dobunni tribe joins Boudica

Hearing of Boudica’s growing force and under huge pressure from the Druids, the ruling family of the Dobunni tribe decides to join the rebellion. A continuous rebel bloc is now formed which separates the Midlands from the lands of King Cogidubnus to the south (see Figure 3).

Although the intense persuasion campaign of the Druids has tilted many of the tribal rulers closer to joining the rebellion, the majority remain neutral, fearful of possible Roman retaliation. This is because many of these tribes (the Corieltauvi, Cornovii, Ordovices, and Deceangli) lie throughout the Midlands region, where the bulk of the Roman forces in Britain are distributed.

Verulamium is razed

Following the destruction of Londinium, the rebels swing north onto Watling Street, with the Gallo-Belgic settlement of Verulamium being put to the flame and destroyed.

The rebels march north along Watling Street

Boudica’s massive force, by now having swelled to a size nearing 130,000 rebels, then continues north along Watling Street, the route which leads to the Midlands area where Paulinus will be found. The rebels in our hypothetical scenario have reached this point in a fraction of the time it took them historically. The stage has been well prepared for a defeat in detail operation: the bulk of the IX Hispana legion has been destroyed, the II Augusta legion remains hopelessly pinned down at its base in Exeter by the Durotriges tribe, and Paulinus is seriously struggling to scrape together enough men to make a stand.

Boudica is now entering the most crucial phase of her mission: to seek and destroy the last two mobile legions in the land.

This is the critical showdown that will decide the fate of Britain and Celtic society on the island, and the topic we shall take up in the second part of this series.

Preliminary note on Graham Webster

This article draws heavily on Graham Webster’s Boudica: The British Revolt Against Rome AD 60, and for good reason. Webster (31 May 1913 – 21 May 2001) was a highly respected and pre-eminent specialist in the field of Roman-British archaeology.

Notes

[1] See Webster, Kindle location 197.

[2] Prehistoric settlement of the British Isles [Wikipedia]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prehistoric_settlement_of_the_British_Isles

[3] Aside from the four Gallo-Belgic tribes which existed along the southern tier of Britain (the Belgae, Atrebates, Regni, and Cantiaci), there was some inland penetration of these newer Celtic settlers. This included the Trinovantes tribe itself, in addition to small pockets within the borders of the Catuvellauni tribe.

[4] See Webster, Kindle location 1560; also Figure 3 at location 1053.

[5] See Webster, Kindle location 2109.

[6] See Webster, Kindle location 641.

[7] See Webster, Kindle location 1212.

[8] See Webster, Kindle location 1217–1225.

[9] See Webster, Kindle location 2282, 2296.

[10] See Webster, Kindle location 1005.

[11] See Webster, Kindle location 1476.

[12] See Cassius Dio. Roman History. Book 62, Chapter 2.

[13] Although a Fabian strategy certainly involves guerilla warfare, the specific term “guerilla war” typically applies to a smaller, weaker force engaging a more powerful opponent in asymmetrical warfare. This was technically not the case for Boudica’s huge rebel force during 60–61 AD, hence the Fabian strategy concept is a more appropriate description

[14] Although some online sites explaining the defeat in detail concept appear to suggest the context of a single battle only (or several battles over a very short period), legitimate sources seem to indicate an indeterminate length of time – even as long as an entire campaign. See Erickson (2003), Preface, p. xvii.; see also Field Manual FM 3-90

[15] See Webster, Kindle location 1426.

[16] See Webster, Kindle location 1595.

[17] See Webster, Kindle location 1540.

[18] Location of the Cornovii tribe: see Ptolemy, The Geography, Book II, Chapter 2.

[19] See: Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars. Book VI (Nero), XVIII.

[20] See Tacitus, The Annals. Book XIV, Chapter 30

[21] See Tacitus, The Annals. Book XIV, Chapter 32.