Akhmed Chataev: The inconvenient ‘fighter against Russia’ accused of planning the Istanbul attakcs

July 3rd, 2016

Awake Goy

The confusing operation in Lopoto Gorge

On August 29, 2012, Georgian special units carried out a bloody operation in the foothills. This was the most serious incident in Russia-Georgia relations since the 2008 war. Police engaged an Islamist group which held hostage five Lapankuri inhabitants for two days. Negotiations failed, making fighting inevitable. TV showed corpses of people in camouflage and the sizable captured arsenal: Kalashnikovs, Makarov pistols with silencers, a sniper rifle, grenade launchers, most modern binoculars.

The militants wanted to penetrate into Dagestan

Seven militants were killed, as well as 3 cops. 10 militants escaped into the forest. The government immediately said it could have been a provocation which was in Russia’s interests. Georgian leaders believed these people came from Dagestan, but it turned out to be incorrect. Several militants spoke Georgian. Two of them were Kistintsy, a Chechen group living in Georgia. Freed hostages helped clarify the intent of the militants: they wanted to go to Dagestan, not the other way around. This raised the specter of 2000’s. Was Georgia once again becoming a Chechen Islamist base? That’s what Moscow had always said. The Putin-Saakashvili enmity only broadened the chasm separating Russia and Georgia. Paranoia, conspiracy theories, and espionage accusations blossomed on both sides.

The Lopoto Gorge events raise many questions. The Ivanishvili camp openly voiced its suspicions that the former parliamentary majority could have sponsored the Islamists. He promised to disclose evidence in June. “Everyone knows that the militants used Georgia as a transit point for many years prior to the 2008 war. We have stopped it, it will never happen again. There are suspicions that the government collaborated with them, or at least knew they were present. These suspicions were launched by the newly appointed ombudsman Ucha Nanuashvili. His annual report was published on February 1, where the Lopoto Gorge operation had its own chapter. Nanuashvili blamed former government in transferring almost 120 Chechen terrorists from Europe to Georgia, arming and housing them, and training them on two military bases. But with what puprose? And why did it then attack the militants? “I don’t know – said Nanuashvili – but they believed the government would open a corridor into Russia. They were all very young, 18-25. Maybe they were going to be used against Russia. Or to settle internal scores.” Nanuashvili cited anonymous “witnesses” when asked for evidence. “I am not a journalist, I have the right to ask questions. Those aren’t final conclusions.” Saakashvili rejected the accusations. “We were not interested in destabilizing the situation before the elections. We wanted to improve the population’s conditions, not stage a bloodbath in a forest. But what if this group entered Russia and killed people? How would Moscow react? They would have gone after the militants, entering Georgia’s territory in pursuit.”

During the operation, Georgia’s Minister of Defense was Bacho Akhalaya who was arrested in November 2012 for abuse of authority and mistreatment of soldiers. Both political camps note that one of the reasons for the tragic outcome of the clash was the competition between Akhalaya and then-Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili, who now heads the “United National Movement” party.

Saakashvili claims the government knew of the militants only after they kidnapped five Georgians, on August 26. We were able to meet with three of them, however, they did not want to talk to us. Their relatives said they were forced to act as guides on the way toward the border with Dagestan. After two days they were exchanged for a border guard. “When we saw they have satellite phones, we asked the Americans to intercept their communications, but it was no use,” Saakashvili said. “We told the CIA rep about it. In addition, we warned the Swiss in order to show we had nothing to hide.”

Before the battle, the authorities began negotiations, demanding the militants turn back. Georgian government was represented by Zelimkhan Khangoshvili. He commanded a unit of 100 militants between 2000 and 2005. FSB considers him a terrorist, but Georgia’s special services often used his help due to his familiarity with local conditions. We met with him in a restaurant on the outskirts of Tbilisi, where he told us about the militants’ final hours:

“The detachment was in a forest, high in the mountains. They were waiting for us. All they had to do is cross the mountain. I said it was a mistake, Georgia would not let them pass. They were told that if they lay down their arms, those who came from Europe will have to leave, while others will be able to return home. They were very aggressive, and did not want to make any concessions. It was a dead end.”

But who were these 17 militants in Lopoto Gorge? Many were from the Chechen diaspora in Europe, particularly Austria. All told, 14 came from abroad. Two entered Georgia illegally from Russia, through Dagestan. 12 others entered the country legally: the first half in April-May 2012, the second in August. Some took a direct flight from Europe, others through Istanbul, yet others crossed the border from Turkey at Sarpi. 11 had Russian passports which gave them to remain in Georgia without a visa. 7 had entry permits due to their status as Chechen refugees: three were issued in Austria, two in France, and one each in Finland and UK. The ombudsman claims that some were able to get Georgian passports with the aid of European embassies.

Thus these individuals came to Georgia weeks and even months before the battle.“Majority of them were Islamists, but some maintained contacts with Russian special services,” says Saakashvili loyalist and Georgia National Security Council Secretary Giga Bokeria. “Not a single European country warned us they were Islamists. Georgia’s MVD claims these individuals did not conceal their arrival in Georgia, so that the previous government knew everything about them.

10 of the militants were never caught. The ombudsman supposes the previous government’s officials helped them run away. One of them, nicknamed Abu Hamza, fought for two months in Syria, then returned to Austria. He gave an interview to a Foreign Policy journalist in Pankissi Gorge, shortly before the Boston attack. He said that about 100 Chechens were fighting against the Syrian government, but did not say anything about the Lopoto Gorge group.

A Chechen refugee in Austria

Merabi Margoshvili has no doubts his son Aslan was manipulated. In September 2011, the 22-year-old man dropped out of college. “He said he was going to his friends in Finland. They were sending him money. He said he’d return in a year. But he returned in two months, saying it was too cold, and that he’ll go to Slovakia instead. I don’t know with whom.” In the end he turned up in Egypt. In March 2012 he returned to Georgia without telling his father. “Like others, he went to Egypt to study,” Merabi thinks. “He did not attend the mosque here, he hated the Wahhabites. Last summer, many Chechens from Europe came to Duisi. The government had a plan. They were manipulating the Chechens.”

Merabi believes in a conspiracy theory. He is sure he has proof, which he already gave to the human rights defenders. It’s a license to carry weapons, specifically a Stechkin automatic pistol, issued to his son on July 23, 2012, a month before his death. Georgian MVD confirmed its authenticity, but claimed it was not difficult to obtain one. Why would a young man who just returned to the country need such a weapon? The ministry said that captured weapons were not listed in governmental inventories.