They were then able to prepare their operation, probably over a period of
months. And they did all this apparently with total operational security,
preventing any intelligence agency – whether Afghan or Western – from having
an inkling of their intentions.
The second lesson is the converse: if the Taliban are stronger than some
thought, Afghanistan’s own security forces are weaker. The Afghan National
Army and police have primary responsibility for Kabul’s security, a state of
affairs that is supposed to be replicated across the entire country by the
end of 2014. These attacks raise serious questions over their fitness for
the job.
That matters because local security forces are the West’s exit ticket from
Afghanistan: foreign troops can only leave when the country’s own soldiers
and police are fit to take over. America and Britain have already announced
that their combat units will go by the end of 2014. But will they be able to
leave if Afghan security forces are unable to prevent attacks like Sunday’s?
That raises the starkest question of all: if real negotiations with the
Taliban do commence, who will have the most bargaining power? On the
evidence of yesterday, the West will not be dealing with a weakened force
desperate for a respite. On the contrary, the Taliban have significantly
strengthened their ability to influence Afghanistan’s political future.
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