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July 4th, 2023 
Awake Goy 
The 8th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was held in Pyongyang from June 16-18, 2023.
The KCNA reports that the interim outcomes for the first half of 2023 were summarized, and the issues of the party’s development and strengthening, state-building, diplomatic, and defense strategies in the context of the changing international environment were discussed.
The plenary meeting followed the classical structure of the recent years of Kim Jong-un’s rule: a report noting the results and setting tasks; discussion in sections; and final processing at the meeting of the Central Committee Politburo; in this model, ordinary members of the Central Committee clearly participated in decision-making. The sole exception was Kim Jong-un’s attendance at the plenary meeting without him delivering a speech or chairing the Politburo meeting, which was regarded as yet another proof of government weakness. “Given that its satellite launch failed (author’s note – we are talking about the launch on May 31) and that there were not many accomplishments in various areas, including the economy, we presume that it may have been difficult (for Kim) to directly come to the front,” Koo Byoung-sam, a spokesperson for the unification ministry, said in a regular press briefing.
What was discussed at the plenum?
“Regarding the courageous continuation of the fight to complete the primary political tasks for the current year.” It was reported that progress was seriously hindered by the “adventurous machinations and reactionary offensive of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique, but under the leadership of Kim Jong-un, the party and the people as a whole have made progress. As a result, the unstable irregularity, which was identified in different sectors at the beginning of the year, has been noticeably eliminated, and it significantly increases the coefficient of production growth in all areas of economic construction. Among the more specific ones are the construction of irrigation systems, the achievements of the metallurgical and chemical industries, and indeed much success in the construction industry: housing complexes with thousands of apartments are being commissioned one after the other.
The rise in the volume of grain output, which was designated as a priority target for the current year, was one of the issues in agriculture that were reviewed during the plenary meeting.
Separately, it “analyzed and summarized in detail the implementation of the new child-rearing policy, which was put forward at the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee. Over the last two years, a significant effort has been made to enhance milk production. Well-organized system and procedure to supply dairy products have been established. As a result, all kindergarten-age children had the opportunity to receive dairy products every day, and this is “one of the most remarkable changes made in the life of our people by the Eighth Party Central Committee.”
The shortcomings, too, were thoroughly dealt with, but there were only general words in the public texts. Only the section on the development of military capabilities criticized the irresponsibility of the officials who oversaw the preparation for the launch of the satellite, calling it “the most serious failure of the military reconnaissance satellite launch, the important strategic work in the field of space development, on May 31.” In order to successfully launch the reconnaissance spacecraft into orbit as soon as possible, officials and scientists have been urged to thoroughly examine the causes of the launch failure and draw lessons from it. However, no precise timeframe was specified.
This formulation, in the author’s opinion, may be owing to the fact that the satellite was not launched during the entire “window of opportunity”. This indicates that the issues were more significant than anticipated and could not be resolved in 10 days. However, based on the appointments that followed, it appears that no retaliation against or firing of members of the military-industrial complex who would serve as scapegoats has taken place.
In the author’s opinion, Seoul and Co. misinterpreted the very fact that the failed launch was openly written about in the newspapers and this information was thus intended to the domestic audience. The author’s long-noted observation that under Kim Jong-un, flaws or failings started to be written more publicly about, means for Pyongyangologists that the disaster could not be covered up.
The foreign policy part of the report noted “the relevance of a sharp and deft military, technical, political, and diplomatic response” to the international situation and that “in response to deliberate and blatant machinations to exacerbate military tensions by enemies, suppressive and offensive countermeasures should always be taken immediately and decisively, consistently adhering to the principle of countering “action with action.” The plenum unanimously approved specific plans for implementing such countermeasures and ways to respond.” Whether this means a new round of launches, a nuclear test, or something else, we will soon see, because these are precisely countermeasures in response to similar moves by Washington and Seoul.
Pyongyang expressed a desire to enhance “the production of powerful nuclear weapons” during the plenum. “The situation on the Korean Peninsula, which is spinning out of control, requires the DPRK to continuously update its military capabilities.“
In addition, “the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee set forth important tasks for conducting external activities independently and more actively on the principle of defending the sovereignty and national interests to cope with the swirling international military and political situation such as further strengthening solidarity with the countries which are opposed to the U.S. brigandish strategy for world supremacy.” We are waiting for some important steps in the Russian direction.
“On Breakthrough Measures for the Development of Education.” A set of measures aiming at “transforming the structure of education in the country to make it suitable for advanced learning, to improve the content and methods of education in accordance with global trends in educational development” was submitted to the plenum for discussion. For the author, this is an important section because while humanities is studied in a peculiar manner in the DPRK, the standard of the exact and natural sciences is quite world-class and in line with global trends. The development of the country’s military-industrial complex is good evidence of the existence of numerous and trained engineering personnel.
“On decisively enhancing the role of leadership in the people’s committees at all levels.” Party Central Committee Secretary Jo Yong-won, who oversees party work, said in this context that “very great are the trust and expectation reposed by our Party on the officials of the provincial, city and county people’s committees, who are powerful locomotive leading the development of their regions and are in charge of the people’s living.” This is a continuation of a long-standing course: party managers must serve as an example to the masses since their attitude toward the leaders provides the basis of trust in the regime, and if the party ceases to be the moral vanguard, the situation will be similar to that in some other socialist countries. However, whereas previously such a “motivational campaign” targeted grassroots organizations, it now targets “medium” level.
“On Issues Arising in the Strengthening of the People’s Power.” Choe Ryong Hae, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, proposed a draft on new methods of electing deputies. The official head of the legislative branch “stressed the importance of improving the method of electing deputies, who are the people’s representatives responsible for state affairs, to the effect that they can display high political consciousness, initiative and ingenuity, aware of their sacred and responsible position given by the state and people. There was a briefing on the new method of electing deputies which was studied in the orientation of helping the working masses fully exercise their responsibility and rights as genuine masters of the state and society in conformity with the popular character of our state power and of further consolidating and developing the democratic election system based on the principle of centralism.” Sounds very interesting, but alas, no details yet.
“On Important Measures to Deepen the Establishment of Discipline in the Party.” According to Jo Yong Won’s speech, it is said that in accordance with Kim Jong-un’s doctrine of party building “the building of party discipline should be put forward as a crucial priority task and important line of party building and activities in order to give full play to the WPK’s might as a party making revolution and struggle.” Jo Yong Won “made a report on the accounts of research for the ways of improving the new machinery and work system in the field of discipline supervision on the basis of the theory of party building in the new era.” The authorities are considering modifying the package of measures created to tighten party discipline because, based on the wording, they have not had any discernible outcomes. This might include giving the revision bodies a bigger role.
Organizational issues. As we noted above, there was no purge for the failed launch, but Defense Minister Kang Sun Nam went from being a candidate member of the WPK Politburo to a full member. In addition, two members of the political establishment who had been in the shadows for some time returned to the ranks, while some zealous Pyongyangologists had even declared them to be persecuted. Kim Yong Chol was by-elected as alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, while O Su Yong was elected as secretary of the Party Central Committee and was appointed as department director (apparently economic) of the Party Central Committee.
Who are these honorable people? 79-year-old O Su Yong was born in 1944. In December 1999, he was appointed Minister of Electronic Industry, and in April 2009, he became Vice Premier of the Cabinet. In June 2010, O resigned as deputy prime minister and was appointed Chief Secretary of the North Hamgyong Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Provincial Committee in July of the same year. In September 2010, O was elected to the Central Committee of the WPK.
In 2014, he left the province for the central office, becoming chairman of the budget committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and in 2016 he took up the positions of Politburo member and head of the economic department of the Central Committee. After that, in the West he came to be considered the main technocrat and responsible for the country’s economy.
In 2019, O Su Yong accompanied Kim Jong-un to Vladivostok.
After the December 2019 plenum of the WPK Central Committee, O was apparently removed from his positions as Central Committee department chief and Politburo deputy chairman. As NKNews analysts noted, “the veteran economic politician may have been demoted.” Western experts and the media of South Korea, which tend to interpret any reshuffle of power as a sign of the regime’s imminent collapse, immediately noted that “his return comes at a time when the North is facing severe food shortages and economic difficulties, exacerbated by harsh global sanctions and the closure of the country’s border due to COVID-19.” According to Koo Byoung-sam, a spokesperson for the unification ministry, “The North seems to have reappointed him to overcome (difficulties) as it currently lacks economic achievements,”
Kim Yong Chol, 77, was known as the head of military intelligence and “the general behind numerous attacks on the South Korean military. He was blamed for both the sinking of the corvette Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong , as well as the 2015 incident for which the ROK version at the time (which is note-worthily reminded of today) was that the Northerners had mined the area south of the DMZ. Therefore, his return to power was commented as “the return of the hardliner,” but this interpretation seems incorrect to the author because the inter-Korean rapprochement of 2018-19 also took place under his patronage. Kim was the North’s chief negotiator with the United States, but after a failed summit in Hanoi in 2019, he began to be pushed back and when he did not appear in public at all for a while, it was thought that “the hawks had eaten the pigeon.”
In 2021 Kim Yong Chol lost his post as North Korean secretary of Inter-Korean Affairs (because the post was abolished at the party congress) and remained as head of the United Front Division. In June 2022 he was replaced in this position by then Foreign Minister Ri Son-gwon (again interpreted as strengthening hardliners), and in September 2022 he was removed from his position as member of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly. Now Kim is apparently in charge of the inter-Korean direction again, although Seoul is not sure if he will replace Ri Son-gwon or Kim Yo-jong as the main person speaking on the issue. Oh Gyeong-seob, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, suggests that he is more likely to be an advisor to them, but (of course!), “this is not good news for those hoping for improvements in inter-Korean relations.”
One could make a joke here about the quality of DPRK experts who believe that only pigeons are removed, and only hawks appointed, but the author draws attention to something else. The organizational results of the plenum confirm the leadership style of the young head of State. A professional team that does not meet expectations leaves their positions, but may return after a period of time. And such rotation instead of repression is the hallmark of Kim Jong-un.
Thus, while Western commentators have focused on the quote about the satellite and Kim Jong-un’s lack of speech, we consider it an interesting event, where a number of “long-range” initiatives were presented, and we will attentively follow their implementation.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
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